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INTRODUCTION: THE ROLE OF WATER 
MARKETS IN THE AMERICAN WEST 
 
In the American West, there is a well-known divergence 
between the spatial and temporal supply of surface 
water and the demand of agricultural and urban users 
for that water.  In general, mountainous regions with 
high precipitation and winter snowfall tend to be 
sparsely populated or poorly suited to agriculture.  
Conversely, large agricultural and urban centers have 
often outgrown local water supplies.  Water for 
agricultural, urban, and environmental uses is most 
needed during precisely those summer months when 
there is no precipitation.  Historically, these concerns 
have been addressed through the construction of large-
scale public water storage and distribution projects (for 
general accounts, see Worster, 1985 or Reisner, 1986).  
However, in recent years, increasing environmental 
concerns and changes in the political climate have 
reduced the feasibility of further dam building in the 
American West.  As a result, there has been an increase 
in emphasis on institutions and mechanisms that attempt 
to reallocate the limited available water supply amongst 
competing users (Vaux & Howitt, 1984, Howe et al., 
1986). 
 
What is the economic rationale underlying the 
reallocation of water?  In the United States (U.S.), water 
rights are usufructuary, implying a right to use water 
rather than outright ownership.  In the arid West, the 
institutions used to determine water rights are the result 
of the historical interplay between the legacy of English 
common law and the westward expansion of settlers, 
agricultural and mining interests in the 19th century 
(Anderson, 1983; Johnson & DuMars, 1989).  As a 
result, the distribution of the ownership of water rights 
is quite distinct from the spatial pattern of potential 
productivity of water.  The most common water rights 
system in the West is the appropriative, or queuing, 
system.  Under the appropriative water rights regimes, 
holders of senior water rights will receive their full 
annual allocation before junior rights holders receive 
any water.  This means that during droughts, senior 
rights holders may receive a full allocation and junior 
rights holders may receive no water.  Because many 
urban centers hold junior rights and many agricultural 
producers that grow low-value crops hold senior rights, 
there are clear economic gains to be made from systems 
that allow trade of water between users.  Indeed, the 
driving force for any water market is a difference in the 
values of the water in use between two water users (for 
general descriptions, see Hartman & Seastone, 1970; 
Saliba & Bush, 1987; Howe et al., 1986).  Note that this 
does not mean that users must be systematically 
different for gains from trade to be possible.  Two farms 
of the same size with identical cropping patterns will 
both gain from trading water if they start with different 
initial allocations of water (for example, if one is a 
senior rights holder and the other a junior rights holder). 
 
Hence, in economic terms, the price at which water is 
actually traded is unimportant.  Trade is driven by 
differences in the value of the water in use between two 
potential traders.  This value in use is quantified by the 
value of the marginal product, namely the incremental 
value of the increased output resulting from having an 
additional unit of water.  Thus, differences in the value 
of the marginal product of water (VMP) are a 
prerequisite for trade.  Moreover, the difference in the 
VMP between two potential traders must be larger than 
any transaction costs that the traders incur in the course 
of searching for trading partners.  These transaction 
costs include not only any transfer charges levied by 
water districts and wheeling expenses, but also the costs 
of finding suitable partners to effect a transaction. 
In an agricultural setting, a farmer’s VMP of water will 
vary not only from year to year as a function of his 
overall allocation and cropping decisions, but also 
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throughout the growing season as the farmer adjusts to 
changes in climate.  In studying trading behavior in 
water markets, it is critical to understand this distinction 
between the price of water and its value in use.  This 
difference explains why at certain times of year or in 
certain regions, “cheap” water can go unsold. 
 
Of course, there are many difficulties in establishing 
functional water markets (Young, 1986; Frederick, 
1986; Howitt, 1994).  These range from the existence of 
legal constraints on the transfer of water rights, to the 
issue of third-party impacts, to the need for adequate 
transportation capabilities if the water is to be 
transported large distances.  As a result, although a 
number of water markets exist in the western U.S., they 
have tended to be quite distinct in their nature and 
institutional design (Saliba, 1987; Carey & Sunding, 
2001).  Some water markets, such as the Colorado-Big 
Thompson Project in Colorado, have well-established 
market prices and anonymous exchange between buyers 
and sellers.  Other markets, such as those found in the 
Central Valley Project (CVP) in California, have no 
such institutions (Carey & Sunding, 2001).  Instead, 
individual buyers and sellers must engage in costly 
search to find trading partners, negotiate a price, and 
effect the legal transfer of the water right.  Despite these 
high transaction costs, true arms -length transfers (as 
opposed to barters between members of the same 
kinship or corporate group) do still occur in informal 
water markets without posted prices and a centralized 
trading location.  In this paper, we consider one such 
informal water market, the Westlands water market in 
the Central Va lley of California (Olmstead, 1998).  
Westlands Water District is the largest agricultural 
water district in the country.  Moreover, because it holds 
junior rights within the Central Valley Project 
allocation, it represents an agricultural setting with 
extreme water scarcity.  As a result, there are few 
administrative barriers to trading water between users 
within the water district, and an active agricultural water 
market exists.  In terms of the volume of water traded, 
this water market is the largest in the country.  As such, 
it offers a glimpse into the possible future of agricultural 
water trading in California and elsewhere in the West. 
Using water-trading data from Westlands for the period 
1993-1996, we describe how seasonal and annual 
changes in climate and the crop cycle interact with the 
existing institutional mechanisms in Westlands to 
determine trading behavior.  Moreover, we discuss how 
farmers of different sizes use the market and the role of 
individual loyalty in determining how trading partners 
are chosen in this informal market setting.  Finally, we 
discuss how changes in market structure could affect 
Westlands farmers, and the possible distribution of these 
changes. 
OVERVIEW OF THE WESTLANDS WATER 
DISTRICT 
 
The Westlands Water District is the largest district in 
the Central Valley Project in California, serving nearly 
eight hundred farms, which cover 600,000 acres.  In 
comparison to other water districts served by the Central 
Valley Project, Westlands holds junior rights for its 
water deliveries.  Thus, in most years, it receives less 
than its full allocation of 1,500,000 acre-feet (where 
1AF equals 326,000 gallons of water).  Because of its 
size and its lack of senior water rights, Westlands is the 
largest agricultural water markets in the United States.  
 
Moreover, even within the Westlands Water District, 
water is allocated according to a priority rights system, 
with farms belonging to one of two main priority areas 
(Olmstead, 1998; Carey and Sunding, 2001).  The most 
senior water right is priority area one, covering 337,000 
acres.  This land was part of the original Westlands 
Water District, and under a 1963 contract with the 
Bureau of Reclamation, is entitled to 900,000 acre-feet 
of water in a full-delivery water year.  This means that 
farms  with land in priority area one will receive 2.6 
acre-feet of water per acre of land in full-delivery years.  
Priority area two represents a more junior right than 
priority area one.  Covering 187,000 acres, this land was 
originally part of the former Westplains Water District, 
and was annexed to Westlands.  Land in priority area 
two is entitled to 250,000 acre-feet of water in a full-
delivery water year, corresponding to 1.3 acre-feet per 
acre.  Finally, there is also a priority area three, with the 
most junior water rights.  However, this area only 
covers 10,000 acres, and will not be considered further 
in this paper. 
As previously mentioned, in a water queue system of 
the kind found in Westlands, in a dry year, senior water 
rights holders (in priority area one) may receive their 
full allocation, while junior rights holders (those in area 
two) receive a reduced allocation or none at all.  The 
water allocation in Westlands operates on a water year 
basis, where the annual interval is defined from March 
of one year to March of the following year (Carey & 
Sunding, 2001).  The Bureau of Reclamation typically 
announces its annual allocation in several stages at the 
beginning of the water year.  Since Westlands Water 
District operates a sophisticated hydraulic and metering 
system, farms may take delivery of their allocation on 
demand throughout the water year.  Whether they use 
all of it or not, farmers must pay for their entire water 
allocation at the start of the water year.  However, 
depending on hydrological conditions and storage 
capacity in the San Luis reservoir, a portion of each 
farm’s allocation may be carried over into the following 
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water year.  In wet years, carry-over may not be 
allowed. 
 
Farms in all priority areas grow a variety of crop types, 
including both annual and perennial crops.  In 
particular, many of the farms in priority area two (with 
junior water rights) have very good soils and grow high 
value tree crops.  Because the spatial distributions of 
water queue priority and crop type are quite different, it 
should be clear that there are significant gains to be 
made from the trade of water rights.  By purchasing 
water in the water market, farms acquire an option that 
expires at the end of the water year, when the original 
allocation expires.  Moreover, because water may only 
be sold within the Westlands Water District, and all 
deliveries are carefully metered, third-party effects are 
negligible.  As previously mentioned, there are few 
administrative barriers to trading.  Though there is no 
formal water market, an active informal market 
operates.  This means that farmers wanting to trade 
water must locate potential trading partners.  This 
informal market is referred to as a ‘coffee-shop market’ 
after the coffee shops where farmers meet to look for 
trading partners and to negotiate trades. 
 
THE WESTLANDS WATER MARKET, 1993-1996 
 
The data used in this study are a subset of a larger 
dataset containing farm-level information on every 
water trade carried out in Westlands Water District for 
the four water years from 1993 to 1996 (Olmstead, 
1998).  During this period, there were 8,611 recorded 
transfers of water in Westlands Water District.  
However, most of these trades do not represent market 
transactions occurring between separate entities and 
driven by differences in the value in use of water.  This 
situation is a result of farm acreage limitations 
stipulated by the Reclamation Act of 1902 and 
subsequently modified (Carey and Sunding, 2001).  
Under the 1982 amendment to the Reclamation Act, 
farms of less than 960 acres in size may receive Central 
Valley Project at a reduced rate.  Farms may purchase 
water for use on acreage in excess of the 960-acre limit, 
but must pay a higher rate for that portion of the water.  
As a result of this pricing scheme, larger farms have 
been parsed into 960-acre units and distributed amongst 
family members and family trusts (Hundley, 1992).  
This allows technical compliance with the 960-acre 
limit; operationally the farms remain much larger.  
Although on paper, there are eight hundred separate 
farms in Westlands, these are grouped by common 
ownership into around three hundred and fifty trading 
networks.  Farms within the same network may trade 
water internally for efficiency reasons or tax purposes, 
but in both cases, a true market transaction has not taken 
place.  Details of network transactions are given in 
Carey and Sunding (2001).  For the purposes of this 
study, we have excluded all such internal transactions 
between farms that belong to the same corporate entity 
and are operated as a single unit.  Instead, we consider 
only those transactions where an arms -length transfer 
between farms belonging to different networks 
occurred.  In 6481 of the 8611 trades during the four 
water years 1993-1996, internal transfers occurred 
between subunits of a larger network.  This leaves 2130 
trades where the two parties involved in the transaction 
were distinct entities; that is to say, a true arms -length 
transfer of water occurred. 
 
Even when water is transferred between two 
operationally distinct farms, trading may be undertaken 
for a variety of reasons not related to differences in the 
value of the water in use.  For this study, we are 
interested in transactions occurring at a point in time 
between two distinct corporate entities, driven by 
differences in the value of the marginal product of water 
in use (VMP) between the two traders.  Although it is 
not possible to observe directly VMPs, the dataset used 
in this study contains evidence for several 
fundamentally different sorts of behavior, which are not 
consistent with trading driven by differences in VMP.  
Thus, as described below, we have excluded some of 
the remaining 2130 trades. 
 
First, we have aggregated trades occurring on the same 
date and between the same traders.  Many of the traders 
seem to parse large trades into many smaller trades that 
take place simultaneously.  While this is probably 
related to field- or farm-level accounting, the underlying 
transaction of interest is represented by the aggregate 
amount. 
 
Second, many transactions involve traders swapping the 
same amount of water, but with differing vintages (a 
sub-priority area classification).  Because the net 
amount of water traded in such a pair of transactions is 
zero, this cannot be motivated by differences in the 
value of the water in use.  Such swapping activity is 
used to show a loss for tax purposes, by swapping a 
“cheap” vintage for an “expensive” vintage, and is not 
of interest in this study.  Hence, we have removed all 
swaps from the dataset. 
 
Finally, the limited ability to carry over water into the 
next water year drives lagged swapping.  A trader who 
is able to carry water over may buy rights from a trader 
who cannot do so, and sell them back at the beginning 
of the next water year.  Again, differences in VMP do 
not drive such swaps as the initial seller gets back 
exactly the same amount of water that he sold, so that 
the net amount traded is zero. 
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Once these trading activities have been excluded, 1267 
trades remain, which form the basic dataset used in this 
study.  Note that there exist several other activities, such 
as short term speculation and long term rentals, which 
are difficult to isolate, and thus may remain in the 
dataset we have analyzed. 
 
CHARACTERISTICS OF TRADERS IN THE 
WESTLANDS WATER MARKET 
 
Every trade in a market involves both a buyer and a 
seller, and thus we can think of two sides to the market: 
the buyers’ side and the sellers’ side.  There is no 
inherent reason that these two sides should be 
symmetric; indeed we might expect to find systematic 
differences between the kinds of trader who tend to buy 
water and those who tend to sell water.  In the following 
discussion, we will describe characteristics of both sides 
of the market.  The 1267 water trades in the dataset 
represent trading activity by 316 separate trading 
networks (Table 1).  Of these, 224 networks bought 
water and 269 networks sold water in the four water 
years from 1993 to 1996.  Hence, 177 networks both 
bought and sold water during the four-year interval 
(Table 1).  This does not imply extensive speculative 
activity with simultaneous buying and selling because, 
in almost all cases, networks alternated periods of 
buying with periods of selling. 
 
There are approximately 350 potential traders in 
Westlands as this is the total number of distinct trading 
networks.  Hence, roughly 90 percent of potential 
traders in the Westlands Water District (316 out of 350) 
actually participated in the water market in the period 
March 1993 to February 1997.  This percentage is very 
high, given the informal market structure.  The high 
participation rate suggests that the ‘coffee-shop market’ 
is quite good at matching potential buyers and sellers.  
However, in order to look at the distribution of benefits 
from participation in the market, we must also look at 
the frequency of participation and the amounts of water 
traded.  Note also that we only have data on trades that 
did occur, and we have no information about refusals 
and trades that did not occur, even though they might 
have been profitable to both parties. 
 
As mentioned previously, trading networks are 
generally composed of several smaller farms, which 
although legally distinct, are operational subunits of the 
larger corporate entity.  Each of these smaller farms is 
usually 960 acres in size.  A trading network of two 
farms will generally have an aggregate acreage of 1920 
acres, a three-farm network will have 2880 acres, and so 
on.  Thus, the number of farms in a trading network is a 
rough measure of the total acreage of the network.  The 
smallest farms that traded water in Westlands were 
composed of a single subunit, denoted by a size of one.  
The largest farm that traded had a size of 29, implying 
that it is composed of 29 sub-farms, and encompasses 
nearly 30,000 acres.  The mean buyer size was 5.87 and 
the mean seller size was 5.84; these are not significantly 
different. 
 
In Westlands, water allocations are determined by 
priority area.  It is common for farms to hold land in 
both junior and senior water rights area, and thus to 
trade both junior and senior rights.  Trading networks 
may sometimes trade from subunits that are in a junior 
rights area, and sometimes from subunits that are in a 
senior rights area.  We define a single water rights 
priority area for each trading network as the mean of the 
priority areas of those network subunits that traded.  
This is intended to reflect the overall distribution of land 
with trading potential between priority areas for each 
trader.  In the dataset, senior water rights are labeled as 
area one and junior rights are labeled as area two.  Thus, 
the mean priority area of farms is a continuous variable 
with a range from one to two.  For buyers, the mean 
priority area was 1.50, and for sellers it was 1.40.  As 
we might expect given a queuing system for water 
allocation, buyers tended to have slightly more junior 
rights than sellers. 
 
Given that the number of trades over the four-year study 
period exceeds the number of distinct traders, most 
traders participated in the market on more than one 
occasion (Table 2).  Nonetheless, the modal trading 
frequency for both buyers and sellers was one: 58 
buyers and 62 sellers only traded water once during the 
four-year interval (Table 2).  Whereas most traders 
bought or sold water only a few times, a small number 
of traders participated in the market on many occasions.  
One buyer undertook forty purchases, and two sellers 
each sold water on forty-one separate occasions (Table 
2).  Note that the mean frequency of purchases for 
participating farms (1267/224 = 5.7) is higher than the 
mean frequency of sales (1267/269 = 4.7).  Using a t-
test we test the null hypothesis that the two populations 
of trading frequencies have the same mean: the t-
statistic for this test is 1.70.  Thus, at the 5 percent level, 
we fail to reject the null hypothesis that the means are 
the same. 
 
In the months in which they traded, 66 percent of buyers 
and 68 percent of sellers traded only once (Table 3).  
Only 4 percent of buyers and 11 percent of sellers 
traded more than three times in any month.  The t-
statistic for the null hypothesis that purchase and sale 
frequencies have the same mean is 4.95.  Thus, we 
reject the null hypothesis: the mean monthly trading 
frequency for buyers, 1.53, is significantly different to 
that for sellers, 1.77.  One possible explanation for this 
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is that farms that are left with a large amount of unused 
water towards the end of the water year are only able to 
sell it in smaller units, as carryover water is inherently 
less attractive to buyers. 
 
ANNUAL AND SEASONAL TRADING 
VARIABILITY 
 
In Westlands, irrigated water is used as an input to 
agricultural production.  Crop water requirements vary 
significantly throughout the year as a result of both 
climatic and agronomic factors.  Because of this 
variability, we would expect to see distinct cycles in 
water trading activity.  Moreover, the Central Valley 
Project allocates water to Westlands on a water-year 
basis, and this also affects trading activity through the 
year. 
As might be expected, the number of trades was higher 
in the drought years (1993 and 1994) than in the 
following wet years (1995 and 1996), but the mean 
trade size was larger in wet years than in dry (Table 4).  
For the drought years, Central Valley Project (CVP) 
allocation to Westlands was 50 percent or less, whereas 
in the wet years, Westlands received close to a full 
allocation (Table 5).  The total amount of water traded 
in the market during the period 1993-1996 represented 
between 8 percent and 15 percent of the total CVP 
allocation in any year.  Given that market trades 
constitute a relatively small fraction of the total trading 
activity, as discussed previously, this represents a 
significant percentage of the total allocation, and 
suggests that the informal market is reallocating water 
quite successfully to higher values in use. 
 
There is a distinct seasonality to water trading.  Trades 
in February, at the end of the water year, are attempts to 
dispose of water options that are about to expire.  Water 
sold at this time of year may be carried over (if 
permitted), used for preirrigation of fields, or used to 
replenish ground water for those farmers that have 
wells.  Trading activity in March and April relates to 
planning for the coming crop growing season.  In the 
Central Valley, there is generally no precipitation during 
the summer months, so that summer trading is used to 
compensate for crop water requirements resulting from 
differences between expected and realized climate, or to 
make up the shortfall between water input demand and 
initial allocation. 
 
Hence, there are two peaks in market trading activity, 
one in the summer, when crop water requirements are 
highest, and one in February of each year, just before 
the end of the water year (Figure 1).  Moreover, the 
trading patterns observed have different characteristics 
between the drought years (1993 and 1994) and the 
following wet years (1995 and 1996).  Because the pairs 
of wet and dry years are broadly similar, for ease of 
interpretation we have aggregated the two dry years 
(1993 and 1994) and the two wet years (1995 and 1996) 
in the following discussion. 
 
During the drought years, there were two peaks in the 
monthly frequency of trades (Figure 1).  The highest 
frequency of trades occurred in February, and was 
presumably related to the sale of unused options at the 
end of the water year.  A second, smaller, peak occurred 
in August, and probably reflects high crop water 
requirements in the middle of the summer.  On the other 
hand, there was much less variability in the mean trade 
size by month in dry years (Figure 2).  The smallest 
mean trades occurred in February.  As discussed 
previously, this may reflect the inability of traders to 
dispose of large amounts of water at the end of the 
water year when the ability to carry it over is uncertain.  
Mean trades in the summer were not different in size to 
those occurring during the rest of the year.  Hence, the 
total amounts traded by month in the dry years show no 
recognizable seasonal pattern (Figure 3).  It is 
interesting to note that even during the drought years, 
there was significant trading towards the end of the 
water year, and at least some farmers had excess water 
that they were willing to sell.  This suggests that some 
farmers may keep buffer stocks of water until late in the 
growing season to cope with increases in crop water 
demands from unexpected temperature changes.  
Alternatively, trading late in the water year may reflect 
the inability of some potential sellers to find trading 
partners earlier in the year at the prices they are asking 
for. 
 
During the wet years, trading frequencies in each month 
were lower than in the same months during the drought 
years (Figure 1).  Once again, the highest frequency of 
trades occurred in February.  However, in 1995 and 
1996, there was no pronounced increase in summer 
trading frequencies, and with the exception of February, 
trading frequencies remained quite constant throughout 
the rest of the year.  However, the monthly distribution 
of mean trade sizes was bimodal.  In the months from 
April through August, the mean trade size was roughly 
twice that found during the remaining fall and winter 
months.  The highest mean trade size occurred in 
August, and the lowest in March, at the start of the 
water year.  As a result of this, there were two peaks in 
the monthly trading totals during the wet years, in 
February and in August.  The highest total volume 
traded occurred in the month of February.  This suggests 
that during wet 1995 and 1996, some farmers in 
Westlands had more than enough water to meet their 
crop requirements, and had significant amounts of water 
left over at the end of the water year. 
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The larger mean trade size and lower trading frequency 
in wet years compared to dry years both presumably 
reflect changes in the overall availability of water in 
Westlands (Table 5).  We suggest that in wet years, 
traders in the water market were unwilling to buy or sell 
smaller amounts of water, as the spot market prices 
would have been lower.  In order to overcome 
significant transaction costs, transaction size had to 
increase.  It is interesting to note that in the dry years, 
increased summer demand was met by increasing 
transaction frequency, whereas in wet years, transaction 
size increased.  It is likely that during the dry years, 
farmers requiring large amounts of water in the summer 
had to enact many transactions with separate sellers, 
none of who were willing to sell large amounts. 
 
The previous discussion deals with trading patterns at an 
aggregate level.  Alternatively, we can look at the 
annual trading activity for each farm that traded 
(Figures 4 and 5).  In this case, the variable of most 
interest is the annual net trading of each farm; that is to 
say, whether overall, farms sold or bought water over 
the course of the water year.  For both dry and wet 
years, there is a wide distribution of net trading activity 
at the farm level, with some farms in almost all size 
categories being net sellers and others being net buyers 
(Figures 4a and 4b).  This is not surprising as the 
priority area of the farms, and thus their initial 
allocation, are not associated with their size.  Moreover, 
although we have no farm-level data on cropping 
patterns in Westlands, farms of the same size grow quite 
different crop types with widely differing crop water 
requirements in terms of the timing and amount of 
applied water.  No systematic pattern of trading appears 
as a function of farm size.  The range of net trading 
activity is much larger in the wet years than in the 
preceding dry years, presumably reflecting the larger 
overall availability of water and hence a greater 
flexibility for farms to choose how to augment or reduce 
their initial allocation (Figures 4a and 4b). 
 
Because subunits within a trading network are in 
general 960 acres apiece, it is possible to normalize the 
net trading data by overall acreage and to consider what 
proportion of their initial allocation farms traded in the 
water market.  Recall that the full allocation for farms 
wholly in priority area one is 2.6 acre feet per acre of 
land, and for farms wholly in area two, it is 1.3 acre feet 
per acre of land.  In 1995 and 1996, CVP allocations to 
Westlands were essentially 100 percent (Table 5), 
whereas in the preceding drought years, allocations 
were 50 percent or less.  Because of the water queuing 
system, the cutbacks in drought years would have been 
allocated asymmetrically between the junior and senior 
water rights holders. 
A striking feature of the normalized net trading data is 
that for both dry and wet years, a significant number of 
smaller farms appear to have traded quantities equal to 
their entire CVP allocation on the water market (Figures 
5a and 5b).  For comparison, many of the crops 
commonly grown in Westlands have water requirements 
of 2.5 – 3.5 AF/acre of water applied for one harvest.  
There are several possible reasons why farmers might 
sell a large proportion of their annual allocation.  If 
anticipated water market prices are high enough, 
farmers growing low value crops may idle some or all 
of their land.  Some farms have access to ground water 
and crops that can tolerate irrigation with poorer quality 
water (ground water in Westlands is somewhat saline).  
Such farms may substitute pumped ground water for the 
surface water allocation that is sold if spot market prices 
are high enough.  Finally, some of these farms may have 
acreage in adjoining areas outside of Westlands, and 
they may be larger farms than their landholdings in 
Westlands would suggest.  In this case, such farms 
might also sell some portion of their allocation and then 
bring in water from their entitlements outside of 
Westlands if it  is profitable to do so.  Westlands does 
not allow water to be exported from the water district 
but there is no such restriction on importing water. 
 
Conversely, those traders that are buying large amounts 
of water are presumably growing crops with large water 
input requirements on a large proportion of their land.  
The observed pattern of trading suggests that small 
farms that participated in the water market made far 
larger adjustments to their production decisions than 
large farms as a result of being able to trade.  However, 
this does not mean that the gains from trading in the 
market were larger for small farms, as in general the 
larger farms traded larger total amounts of water 
(Figures 4a and 4b). 
 
TRADING LOYALTY 
 
Each of the 1267 transactions that occurred represents a 
trading partnership between a buyer and a seller.  Of 
these partnerships, 729, or 58 percent of them, were 
unique: the two traders involved had no further water 
trades (Table 6).  Fifteen percent of trades involved 
traders who had traded with each other four or more 
times.  One trading partnership undertook ten separate 
trades over the four-year period (Table 6).  From this 
data, we can look at the number of distinct trading 
relationships that evolved over the study period.  There 
were 920 distinct trading relationships in the Westlands 
water market during the period 1993-1996 (Table 6).  
To put this in context, with 316 traders, the total 
possible number of distinct trading relationships is 
316!/(2!314!), or 49770 relationships.  Thus, 1.8 percent 
of all possible trading relationships are represented in 
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the data.  If there were no repeated trading relationships, 
we would see 1267 separate trading relationships in 
1267 trades, which would represent 2.5 percent of 
possible relationships.  The difference between this 
percentage and the 1.8 percent actually observed is a 
reflection of trader loyalty in the market.  These 
numbers suggest that loyalty to previous trading 
partners is a major determinant of future trading 
choices.  Moreover, during the four-year period for 
which we have data, larger farms traded more often than 
smaller farms.  One way of thinking about this is that 
the farms that did trade in any month were on average 
larger than those farms that did not trade.  Smaller farms 
participated significantly less often in the informal 
water market.  It is possible to imagine that this is 
because smaller farms are less able to cope with the risk 
of committing to production levels or crop types that 
require significant trading activity away from their 
initial water allocation.  However, the data presented 
here (Figures 5a and 5b) suggest that at least some small 
farms relied on the water market to procure supplies of 
water quite different to their initial allocation.  
Certainly, as a result of water market participation, these 
farms altered their production decisions far more than 
larger farms that traded water.  Alternatively, smaller 
farms may be unable to commit the human capital 
necessary to engage in costly search and the 
establishment of extensive trading relationships, even 
though the potential gains are large. 
 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
Many studies of water marketing focus on trading 
between agricultural and urban users.  In particular, a 
very large difference between traders in the value of 
water in use is often cited as a prerequisite to overcome 
the significant transaction costs associated with water 
marketing.  However, this study describes a robust 
agricultural water market between agricultural water 
users in a single water district.  Even though all 
agricultural producers in Westlands Water District are 
relatively homogeneous (when compared to potential 
urban water traders), trading is routine and pervasive.  
Moreover, this trading occurs without many of the 
institutions of a well-developed market such as a 
centralized exchange and posted prices.  During the 
study period, ninety percent of farms in Westlands 
participated in the informal water market.  A significant 
proportion of the total annual CVP allocation was traded 
each year (Table 5).  Trading patterns suggest that some 
farms rely on the water market to allow crop production 
choices (and concomitant capital investment) that would 
be impossible without trading.  Overall, the amount of 
water traded between farms each year in Westlands is 
large (often more than 100,000 AF) suggesting that 
there are also large benefits from trading to those farms 
that participate. 
 
During the study period, larger farmers traded more 
often than smaller farms, and traded larger quantities.  
The introduction of new institutions or technologies to 
improve the efficiency of the market would certainly 
improve the aggregate benefits of trading.  The 
distribution of these additional benefits is less clear.  As 
the current informal market appears to favor large 
farmers, it is likely that smaller farmers in Westlands 
would benefit more than large farmers under a system 
with a centralized exchange, brokers and market 
clearing prices.  Because a significant percent of the 
annual allocation is already traded (Table 5), it is even 
possible that large traders would be worse off under a 
centralized exchange system, as they would no longer 
be differentiated from any other trader. 
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Table 1.  Westlands water market structure by trader activity, 1993-1996. 
 
 
 
 
Total number of traders 316 
Total number of buyers 224 
Total number of sellers 269 
Buyers who also sold 177 
Buyers who did not sell  47 
Sellers who did not buy 92 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.  Frequency of market participation for buyers and sellers. 
 
 
Frequency of Number of Number of 
participation buyers sellers 
 
        1 58 62 
        2 37 50 
        3 24 42 
        4 14 28 
        5 15 27 
        6 13 11 
        7 10 12 
        8  6 2 
        9  7 4 
       10  8 6 
       11  6 2 
       12  4 3 
       13  1 7 
       14  4 1 
       16  1 1 
       17  3 1 
       18 0 1 
       19  1 1 
       20  1 1 
       22  2 2 
       23  1 0 
       24  1 0 
       25  1 0 
       26  2 2 
       29  1 0 
       32  1 0 
       35  1 0 
       39 0 1 
       40  1 0 
       41 0 2 
 
 
 Total 224 269 
 
 12 
Table 3.  Monthly transaction frequency by trader. 
 
Monthly frequency Number of Number of 
of transactions buyers sellers 
 
 1 863 830 
 2 230 204 
 3 123 90 
 4 28 56 
 5 15 25 
 6 0 48 
 7 0 14 
 8 8 0 
 Total 1267 1267 
 
Table 4.  Water market trades by water year, Westlands Water District. 
 
 Water year Trades Mean(AF) Max(AF) Min(AF)  Total(AF) 
 
 1993 428 257.8   5000  1  110329 
 1994 348 176.4   1743  1    61373 
 1995 287 550.3 10000  1  157939 
 1996 204 542.0 13000  1    10570 
 
Table 5.  Water market trading as a percentage of yearly Central Valley Project allocation. 
 
Water year Trades(AF) Allocation(AF) Allocation  percent Traded  percent 
 
1993 110,329    750,000  50.0 percent  14.7 percent 
1994   61,373    637,500  42.5 percent     9.6 percent 
1995 157,939 1,500,000 100.0 percent  10.5 percent 
1996 110,570 1,425,000   92.5 percent    7.8 percent 
 
Table 6.  Trading loyalty, Westlands water market. 
 
 Numb er of transactions Frequency Distinct trading 
 between trading partners  relationships 
 
 1 729 729 
 2 238 119 
 3 105 35 
 4 60 15 
 5 60 12 
 6 12 2 
 7 28 4 
 8 16 2 
 9 9 1 
 10 10 1 
 Total 1267 920 
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Figure 1. Frequency of trades by month, Westlands water market
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Figure 2. Mean trade size, acre feet/month, Westlands water market
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Figure 3. Total acre feet traded by month, Westlands water market
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Figure 4a. Net trade size by farm size, dry years (1993-1994)
-20000
-10000
0
10000
20000
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Trader size
A
nn
ua
l n
et
 t
ra
di
ng
, A
F
Individual traders Mean, per size category
 
 
 15 
Figure 4b. Net trade size by farm size, wet years (1995-1996)
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Figure 5a. Net trade size, AF per acre, dry years (1993-1994)
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Figure 5b. Net trade size, AF per acre, wet years (1995-1996)
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